Why is My Secret Leaked? Discovering Vulnerabilities in Device-to-Device
  File Sharing by Bytes, Andrei et al.
On the Insecurities of Mobile D2D File Sharing
Applications
Andrei Bytes Jay Prakash Jianying Zhou Tony Q.S. Quek
Singapore University of Technology and Design
{andrei bytes, jay prakash}@mymail.sutd.edu.sg; {jianying zhou, tonyquek}@sutd.edu.sg
Abstract—With more than 1.3 Billion in cumulative number
of downloads reported, the top six applications compete in the
niche of Wi-Fi Direct D2D file sharing on Android. With the
highest userbase in India and Indonesia, ShareIT itself reports the
number of active users of their application on desktop and mobile
devices exceeding 1.8 billion, ranked top 7 globally by number
of downloads on Google Play and Apple App Store in 2018 [1].
Wi-Fi Direct, also known as Wi-Fi P2P, is commonly used for
peer-to-peer, high-speed file transfer between mobile devices, as
well as a close proximity connection mode for wireless cameras,
network printers, TVs and other IoT and mobile devices. For
its end users, such type of direct file transfer does not result
in cellular data charges and allows to keep their primary Wi-Fi
interface up concurrently with a dedicated Wi-Fi P2P interface,
which is commonly provided by the default wireless module of the
mobile phone. However, despite the popularity of these solutions
demonstrated by Google Play download statistics, we observe
that the software vendors tend to prioritize the ease of user
flow over the security of the implementation, introducing serious
security flaws. We perform a comprehensive security analysis in
the context of security and usability behind the identified flaws
and report our findings in the form of 16 Common Vulnerabilities
and Exposures (CVE), disclosed to the corresponding vendors. To
address the similar flaws at early stage of the application design,
we propose a joint consideration of Security and Usability for
such applications and their protocols that can be visualized in
form of a User Journey Map (UJM).
I. INTRODUCTION
D2D communication in a wider view shall be the dominant
mode of interaction and exchange in future wireless communi-
cation infrastructures for mobile and IoT devices. The adoption
of the fifth generation of cellular mobile communication (5G)
is expected to drive cellular networks from centralized to
device-centric infrastructure, where both the cellular, in-band,
and out-band D2D co-exist [2] [3]. D2D communications facil-
itate a direct connection, single hop communication, between
compatible radio-frequency (RF) devices without the need for
association with access points (APs) or cellular base stations
(BSs). Therefore, the scope of the secure implementation is
not limited only by Wi-Fi Direct. The rapid transformation of
portable devices and demand for more flexible communication
protocols raises the problem of their usability and security
design and strengthens the need to advance existing design
and evaluation practices to avoid future vulnerabilities.
 D2D communications and Wi-Fi Direct: With the in-
troduction of Wi-Fi direct by Wi-Fi Alliance and its integration
by Google into Android 4.0 [4], its user base and use cases
have increased exponentially over the past years [5]. Modern
D2D communication leverages high data rate and is beneficial
for mobile-to-mobile file sharing, wireless printing, screen-
casting, and a wide range of other domains. The adoption
of Wi-Fi Direct, as an out-band (ISM) D2D protocol where
interconnected devices exchange information with each other
directly, without needing a global network connection, had
already reached 1.7 billion in 2016 in consumer devices
(tablets, smartphones, and smart TVs) and is projected to reach
21 billion by 2020. The number of consumer devices per owner
is increasing and is expected to reach up to 7 devices per owner
by 2020. A large portion of them will have human-in-loop
model, hence their role in daily lifestyle and social contexts
cannot be neglected.
The use of Wi-Fi Direct provides significant usability
benefits, as compared to Peer-to-Peer (P2P) communication
over the conventional Wi-Fi access point: abilities for the user
to keep the primary Wi-Fi connection working simultaneously
with Wi-Fi Direct data transfer and a simplified association
user flow. Ensuring security for billions of such connections
is crucial and so is its appropriate adoption by the users.
To understand the ecosystem, human behaviour and security,
we consider two scenarios i) Alice and Bob meet at a place
and Alice immediately wants to share (exchange) some data
(information) with Bob using digital medium and ii) Alice
needs to share information from her cerebral memory, i.e.,
Alice can recall from her memory and converse to Bob. As a
preliminary study a survey of 50 people was conducted where
each pair was subjected to the stated conditions.
The analysis reveals that available D2D sharing applica-
tions on the mobile application marketplaces are surprisingly
popular; mostly due to the two reasons: a) high speed over
Wi-Fi direct D2D RF link and b)straightforward, easy to use
flow of pairing and data exchange. There is tendency to avoid
instant messaging and email for file sharing due to: a) the
requirement of multi-step interaction, remembering lengthy
credentials, usernames or phone numbers, and b) complication
of contact sharing at first meeting. An analogous information
exchange in the physical world, i.e., the case where two
persons can just speak and share information is very trivial
and light in terms of user efforts. In order to capture the
difference in effort and ease of use, we define a term effort-
distance, representing extra steps, compared to the physical
world which are required to complete the same task digitally. It
is noted that effort-distance is high for proximity file exchange
between parties. This opens usability challenges, specific to
data exchange. As we note later, this creates a space for
prioritising economical benefits at a cost of security and
privacy of D2D file sharing mobile applications.
This paper motivates the following research questions:
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RQ1: How secure is the implementation of D2D file sharing
in the most commonly used Wi-Fi Direct sharing
applications on Android?
RQ2: What are the common trade-offs and usability factors
that affect insecure design decisions in such applica-
tions?
RQ3: Can the joint notion of usability over security impact
factors in such applications and underlying protocols
reflect the potential security posture during the early
design stage?
A. Role of UX and UI
From the user experience perspective, the manual input of
passphrases leads to the risk of misconfiguration, commonly
introduced by vendors and end users, such as predictable
and hard-coded passwords, Section II-C. Furthermore, modern,
diverse devices do not always have peripheral support for
manual password input. Although usable security has been
under the radar of research community [6], the pickup of the
concepts for implementation by vendors has been slow [7]
[8]. There exists a spiral of frustration and blame between
users and researchers [8]. Since usability plays significant
role in adoption of mobile applications by people, simple and
easy to use interactions are preferred [9]. However, motives
to accommodate them in designing of interfaces and easing
user experience may weaken the security. We shall see how
usability has been misused at cost of security in top Android
application for file sharing in next subsection.
The core focus of this work is to understand common trade-
offs between security and usability for D2D exchange and
the reasons behind them. Typically, protocol and secure archi-
tecture designers can implicitly account for user interactions
beforehand and hence reduce the risk of security trade-offs in
future implementations. Many existing mechanisms limit the
first-time ability of easy pairing, such as Diffie-Hellman (DH)
protocol which requires two entities to have a common prior
knowledge, modulus and base. This motivates vendors who
wish to use the scheme to provide homegrown workarounds
to achieve seamless pairing of devices which are interacting
for the first time.
In summary, our contributions are the following:
• We perform a practical security-usability analysis of
the most downloaded D2D mobile sharing imple-
mentations, identify and report the findings to the
corresponding vendors, highlighting likely causes of
vulnerabilities and trade-offs in protocol design frame-
works
• We quantify a combined notion of usability and secu-
rity which could help the protocol designers to adapt
and evaluate usability at the early stage to avoid future
trade-offs in implementation
Section 2 studies the security-usability trade-offs in pop-
ular D2D applications followed by inferences for designing
improved protocols. Section 5 describes the proposed method-
ology for User experience quantification.
Application Package name # of installs
SHAREit com.lenovo.anyshare >1 Billion
Xender cn.xender >100 Million
Xiaomi Mi Drop (ShareMe) com.xiaomi.midrop >100 Million
Files by Google com.google.android.apps.nbu.files >100 Million
Zapya com.dewmobile.kuaiya.play >50 Million
SuperBeam com.majedev.superbeam >10 Million
TABLE I. SHORTLISTED APPLICATIONS FOR OUR ANALYSIS
Application Version Protocol used Ports used Encrypted
SHAREit 4.5.84 UDT1 52999 (UDP) No
Xender 5.1.1.Prime HTTP 6789 No
Xiaomi MiDrop 1.22.4 TCP; FTP Random; 2121 No
Files by Google 1.0.220185905 TCP Random; 10061 Yes
Zapya 5.7 (US) HTTP 9876 No
SuperBeam 4.1.3 HTTP 8080 No
TABLE II. OBSERVATIONS ON USE OF PROTOCOLS
II. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF COMMON WI-FI DIRECT
SHARING APPLICATIONS
In this section we analyze the six most downloaded
Wi-Fi Direct mobile file sharing applications to provide
observations of the correlation between usability requirements
and the security of their implementations. Based on download
statistics on Google Play, we have selected most popular file
sharing applications, listed in Table I. The total number of
installations of these applications on Android, building on
Google Play Store statistics, exceeds 1.3 Billion (Table I).
Wi-Fi Direct - based file sharing applications are widely used
and retain a large user base due to the simplicity of the D2D
connection setup and high transfer speeds. However, during
our analysis we have identified a number of workarounds and
security violations that vendors introduce in their products
to untangle the user experience and gain access to a wider
market share. As we show later in this section, the applications
from our shortlist commonly introduce default or predictable
connection credentials for seamless association between peers
or transmit the passphrases through side channels. At the
same time, our analysis shows that the shortlisted applications
prioritize the performance and compatibility over security at
multiple layers of their implementation.
A. Methodology for vulnerability analysis
We combine both static and dynamic vulnerability analysis
techniques and automate the comparative execution analysis
on multiple Android API platforms to achieve the following
goals:
• Determine which network protocols are used for D2D
file sharing
• Locate the corner execution paths which might drop
the encryption of the communication (e.g. Switching
to unprotected Wireless AP instead of keeping the Wi-
Fi Direct link)
• Locate exploitable flaws which enable attacks by
Receiver against the Sender and vice versa (e.g. com-
mand/content injections, vulnerabilities in built-in web
servlets)
• Locate remotely exploitable flaws which allow for
private data leakage by third-party attacker through
device network interfaces
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Statically, for more detailed manual analysis we fingerprint
the execution paths which contain signs of the identifiable
patterns:
• References to known Java and native components and
libraries (e.g. NanoHTTPD in Xender)
• Calls to sensitive or unusual Android APIs (remote
storage binding, process monitoring, command exe-
cution)
• Hard-coded values of certain format (URI schema
fragments, regular expression templates, long number
sequences, tokens, hashes)
• Potential misconfiguration of Android-specific compo-
nents (Permissions, exported Activities, exposed bind-
ing of Intents, Services triggered with poor validation)
• Cryptography-related operations, random string gen-
eration, string encoding methods
• Implementation of remote and local URI validation
(schema matching, regular expressions)
• Conditions which tend to change the execution flow to
fit a particular Android OS version or device vendor-
specific APIs
This is further extended with dynamic analysis to inspect
the insecure behaviour with the following methods:
• Mapping of embedded endpoints to actual D2D shar-
ing code snippets
• Tracing the uses of network sockets when certain
functionality is requested
• Hooking Java and Android API interfaces to inspect
call arguments, specifically where the code relates to
cryptography operations, Wireless AP configuration,
Bluetooth discovery routine.
• Generating a word-list which includes the names of
sent, marked for sharing and received files, IPv4
and hardware addresses involved in communication to
filter out the method calls in execution flow.
Application of these procedures in comparative execution
analysis of identical scenarios on multiple physical and
emulated devices allowed to identify certain discrepancies in
the functions behaviour for deeper manual investigation of
each case.
The corner behaviour cases normally take place when
certain functionality is not supported by the device or is not
permitted in the current Android API. Notable effects of the
latter included fall-backs to unprotected Wireless APs from
Wi-Fi Direct, switching to hard-coded credentials and setup
of insecure limitations for credentials length in particular
execution environments.
B. Shortlisted applications
SHAREit (com.lenovo.anyshare.gps) was launched by
Lenovo in 2015 and has quickly become a world‘s most
used D2D file sharing application. As claimed by the vendor,
(a) SHAREit for PC: Guidance to use default password
(b) Xender: workaround
Fig. 1. Insecure design decisions in SHAREit and Xender
the current number of active users of the application on
desktop and mobile devices exceeds 1.8 billion, with more
than 600 million users in India and Indonesia [1]. It has been
reported in [10] that by the end of 2017, SHAREit reached #5
Worldwide ranking position by number of installations among
non-game applications. Shortly the early version was released,
multiple vulnerabilities were reported, related to weak security
policies and the use of connection password, hard-coded as
“12345678” [11]. From the static analysis we have observed
that the latest version still contains significant parts of the
vulnerable legacy codebase. Notably, despite some of the
functionality is no longer referenced in the UI, but still can be
triggered remotely through the built-in embedded webserver
routes, as shown later in this section.
The Android versions of Xender (cn.xender), SuperBeam
(com.majedev.superbeam), Za-
pya (com.dewmobile.kuaiya.play), and MiDrop
(com.xiaomi.midrop) are another commonly used device-
to-device file sharing applications that actively compete with
SHAREit, with more than 300 million installs on Google
Play, Fig. 2. The newest application in our set, Google
Files (com.google.android.apps.nbu.files) is also referred as
“Files by Google” and “Google Files Go”.
Originally developed within the Google‘s Next Billion Users
(NBU) project to target emerging markets, it is being actively
endorsed on Android and comes pre-installed as a system
application since Android 8 “Oreo” and Android 9 “Pie”, as
well as Android Go editions for lower-end devices [12].
C. Security issues
In this subsection, we summarize our findings, which are
common for the analyzed applications and discuss the usability
context behind them. Notably, during the analysis of shortlisted
targets we have observed that vendors tend to mirror the user
flow and implementation patterns of each other. Partly, the
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Fig. 2. Number of installations: SHAREit vs Google Files
(a) SHAREit: Switching to Wi-
Fi AP
(b) SHAREit: Hotspot security
mode is reset to None
(c) Zapya: Preventing the
passphrase setting for the
hotspot
Fig. 3. Common usability favours
reason for this is the nature of competition for the large existing
user base, which resides on the same platform. A radical
change in user interface or implementation of additional se-
curity features can create competitive disadvantage and thus is
generally avoided. We note that the reflection of identical user
interface and interaction flow (pairing, transfer confirmation)
tends to spread security vulnerabilities which appear to be
common for multiple vendors.
A key property, by which we have picked applications
for our analysis was their advertised use of Wi-Fi Direct
for D2D file sharing. Surprisingly, it was observed that
every application in our shortlist, including Google Files
1.0.220185905 for Android implements additional fall-backs
and is not using Wi-Fi Direct at all times. In particular, a
common behaviour for the analyzed applications is to silently
turn either the Sender or the Receiver into a conventional
Wi-Fi Access Point, often disabling the authentication or
sharing a hard-coded default passphrase. The user, in her turn,
is not informed of such behavior in most cases and expects
the files to be sent through an encrypted Wi-FI Direct link.
We highlight the additional security impact, introduced by
these fall-backs in our findings.
 Usability of Authentication: A number of key design
decisions has been made in the reviewed applications with
a clear priority on seamless device discovery and effortless
association of peers. Vendors introduce custom ways of au-
tomatic peer association, which often includes the use of
default credentials and those which can predicted by the client
programmatically. We have also noticed that the behavior
of the identical application versions regarding authentication
can vary when executed on different Android OS versions.
This varies from sending the password via side channels (e.g.
Bluetooth, QR codes) to the use of completely unprotected
AP in order to get the user out of the obligation to enter
the password. A notable example of these priorities is the
association of SHAREit for Android with its SHAREIT 4.0
for PC companion application to exchange files with Windows
hosts. Upon start-up, the desktop application immediately
raises the AP, using a hard-coded passphrase, which remains
unknown to the user. The user has no control to read or change
the passphrase at this point, before her AP is raised. The
Android device independently predicts this passphrase in order
to associate with the desktop application automatically. The
exploration of the UI showed that a settings dialog which has
no visible link and resides behind a click on the user picture
has a field to change the AP password 1(a). However, even
when the setting is found, a message encourages the user to
use a default password instead, to simplify the connection of
a mobile phone to the AP. No warning or explanation on the
security consequences is given for having this feature enabled.
Alike SHAREit, other applications from our shortlist were
identified to use similar insecure workarounds to simplify
the user flow and the authentication of the Sender and the
Receiver. The descriptions of these issues are listed in Table
III.
 Performance over Security trade-offs Keeping in mind
the wide presence of authentication trade-offs in the reviewed
applications which can facilitate the attacker in gaining access
to the network, we have consequently examined the implemen-
tation of data transmission in the established network between
the Sender and the Receiver. As was previously mentioned,
even though all applications in our list declare Wi-Fi Direct as
their primary way of association, in practice this is not always
the case. Due to the automatic selection of fall-backs which
is normally out of user control, the data transmission happens
through an unprotected Wi-Fi AP or within the existing Wi-FI
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connection. Thus, the functionality which is designed to rely
on the encryption, provided by the network layer by Wi-Fi
Direct is instead exposing the user transmitted files in clear-text
though non-encrypted transport protocols (Table II). SHAREit
uses UDT [13] protocol and relies solely on the network layer
security configuration, thus lacking any additional encryption
or integrity protection for transferred files.
Another notable case which commonly results in user data
being transmitted over existing network connection or the AP
in clear-text is the auxiliary functionality of the shortlisted
applications. Thus, Xiaomi MiDrop introduces a ”Connect
to PC” feature which is different from its primary mode
of operation. Our analysis showed that in this mode the
application exposes unrestricted access to the device filesystem
by acting as an FTP server. The server does not isolate the file
exchange folder nor uses any authentication by default. The
FTP connection is served to an anonymous in-network user.
Naturally, this solution has no encryption at the application
layer and the port is exposed in any network that Android
device is associated to, regardless of the type of this underlying
link.
Except for Google Files, all the reviewed applications also
support a Web Sharing mode which allows to exchange files
over HTTP with other peers. It was observed that in this mode
none of the applications which we have reviewed provide
SSL \ TLS or any other option to protect the confidentiality
of the transferred files, exposing the communication to an
in-network attacker in clear-text (Table II). Additionally,
the embedded web server functionality introduces additional
security vulnerabilities, delivered by its custom endpoints. We
further these in the next paragraph
 Legacy code and vulnerable servlets: SHAREit, at its
early versions, has been actively engaging a built-in web server
functionality. At its current version (4.5.84), this functionality
is still present in the application but is mainly used as a
fallback to communicate with desktops and mobile devices
running platforms different from the host. Our static analysis
of the SHAREit 4.5.84 for Android showed that a major
amount of legacy functionality is not used in the user interface
anymore yet is still served by the web server, exposing a
number of endpoints, that can be remotely triggered from any
network that the device is associated to. The implementation of
this code, including the code-base, currently used to support
the Web share feature, has poor access control mechanisms
and often lacks input sanitation, allowing the attacker to ex-
filtrate files from the device and perform Cross-Site-Scripting
(XSS) against the Receiver. Thus, it was observed that multiple
endpoints of Superbeam Web share mode does not sanitize the
input data, allowing for injecting reflected and stored XSS,
performed by the Sender. For the latter, a stored payload is
rendered into the UI from the filenames, which the Sender
advertises and is rendered from them on the Receiver‘s side.
Another scenario of a Sender-to-Receiver attack was ob-
served in the Google Files application on Android. Due to
the lack of parameter filtering and sanitation on both sides, it
was possible for the Sender to transmit her crafted username
over the network, which allowed to manipulate the contents
of association confirmation dialog at the Receiver side, by
rendering additional layout elements and commenting out
Fig. 4. Google Files: Manipulated association dialog
the unwanted fields. An example of a crafted file transfer
confirmation dialog, with the removed supporting text through
the injection of an open comment tag, is shown in Fig. 4.
Similar to SHAREit, Xender application also provides
a Web share feature for compatibility with desktops and
third-party mobile devices. However, as opposed to SHAREit
which only activates its web-server on port 2999 during file
sharing, Xender immediately starts it in the background with
the application runtime on TCP port 6789 of Android device,
even when no file sharing is in process. Our study of the
reconstructed application code and dynamic analysis identified
an exposed endpoint, which allows to access arbitrary files
from the device through file path manipulation. Regardless
of the user‘s intention to send or receive files, the vulnerable
service is raised automatically and is exposed to anyone in
the same network. This provides a stealth channel to obtain
arbitrary files from the file-system without user notification,
acting as a remote backdoor on the victim Android device.
 Password transmission through side-channels: While
MiDrop and Google Files rely on Bluetooth for proximity
search of their peers, other applications use it as a side
channel to transmit the association credentials between the
Sender and Receiver. SHAREit requires a granted access to
Bluetooth ”to increase user connection speed” (Fig. 5(a)).
However, we have observed that if the Bluetooth connection
is successfully established, SHAREit uses it to transmit the
Access Point credentials in its fall-back mode and seamlessly
associates with the peer device. Otherwise, if the credentials
cannot be transmitted with Bluetooth, the Sender will be
asked to authenticate with a passphrase. Notably, the fact of
establishing a Bluetooth connection is not reported to the user
and requires no pairing or other confirmation. On the contrary,
Zapya makes the user aware about the transmission of AP
credentials over Bluetooth and provides an implicit switch
to disable this feature (Fig. 5(b)). Xender and Superbeam,
in turn, engage QR codes as a primary way to exchange
the credentials, needed for sender and receiver to associate.
The example of such QR code is shown at (Fig. 5(c)) and
encapsulates the credentials in the URI, the AP name and its
passphrase are observed at nm and pw parameters:
http://www.xender.com?nm=AndroidShare_4615
&pw=049a0ae278e5&i=43&p=19638464
 Insecure OS version-specific workarounds on Android
7.1 to 8: The continuous deprecation of APIs in the Android
security lifecycle [14] often introduces additional permission
restrictions for its non-system applications. With a natural
intention to obtain more control on the application behavior
and to improve general security and privacy posture of the
platform, these can cause an unexpected effect for the users,
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(a) SHAREit: ”Bluetooth is used to
increase user connection speed”
(b) Zapya: Switch to disable creden-
tials transmission over Bluetooth
(c) QR-encoded credentials in Xender
Fig. 5. Side-channel transmission of credentials
causing the developers to urgently deploy workarounds. Thus,
with the upgrade Android OS to 7.1, non-system applications
lost the ability to programmatically raise a DHCP-enabled Wi-
Fi Hotspot [15] [16]. If the application is executed on newer
Android APIs, Android 8 and 9, it can use an interface Wifi-
Manager.LocalOnlyHotspotReservation which was introduced
to particularly solve this problem [17].
Although on some devices and platform versions particular
applications from our shortlist are shipped pre-installed with
system privileges (Google Files, Xiaomi MiDrop), they do not
always have this advantage. We have identified a common
insecure workaround, specific to Android 7.1, implemented
by most applications from our list. The efforts of developers
to keep their applications functioning on this platform has
resulted in solutions that override existing in-app security
mechanisms which would be present if the application was
executed with particular Android APIs.
Thus, to keep the file transfer functioning when running
on Android 7.1, ShareIT 4.5.84 , Xender 4.2.2.Prime and
Zapya 5.7 (US) set the Android settings dialog with open
AP (security: none) and ask for the users action to enable
it (Fig. 3(a), 1(b)). Moreover, in a case when the user pre-
configures a hotspot with own WPA2 passphrase in Android
settings, the above-mentioned applications would override
these settings and permanently reset the security mode back
to None (Fig. 3(b)). Remarkably, Zapya even adds an explicit
warning for the user to prevent her from making changes
in the AP configuration: ”Notice: You only need to enable
hotspot. There is no need to change other hotspot settings,
otherwise, making other changes may lead to connection
error” (Fig. 3(c)). Indeed, ignoring this warning and manually
protecting the hotspot with a password in the settings dialog
resulted in complete malfunction of ShareIT 4.5.84 and Zapya
5.7. If the Access Point has WPA2 enabled, the peer is unable
to authenticate and connect. Similarly, in Xender 4.2.2. Prime
the connection dialog doesn‘t allow to associate with its peer
if its password is longer than 8 symbols. This limitation puts
significant security limitations even when the user is concerned
to encrypt her hotspot. Xiaomi Mi Drop applies an identical
workaround for Android 7.1. However, instead of raising an
unprotected host-spot, it sets a predefined password, which
is programmatically predictable by the client. Changing this
default password results in association failure, analogous to
behaviour of SHAREit and Zapya.
 Reported vulnerabilities: Table III lists descriptions of
vulnerabilities and assigned CVE IDs which we have reported
to the corresponding product vendors, based on our findings,
summarized above in this section.
 Open usability problem of Wi-Fi Direct: WPS:
Essentially, Wi-Fi Direct protocol does not have a dedicated
way to agree on a shared secret. The Wi-Fi Protected Setup
(WPS; originally, Wi-Fi Simple Config) was introduced to
facilitate the secure association using either PIN or push button
confirmation. The usability goal was to enhance the flow
for users who are not comfortable with configuration dialogs
and embedded devices which might not have peripherals to
provide a setup interface. The WPS architecture also supports
a Registrar - either a separate device or integrated to the AP
service which helps client devices in enrolling to the network.
The short PIN is commonly used to agree on secret keys [18].
While push button is vulnerable to a nearby attackers, short
numeric PIN can be exposed and guessed in multiple ways
[19] [20]. If the association flow allow the user to set their
own PIN, this adds a human factor to the system, causing a
risk of using predictable numeric combinations. This opens a
research problem to build both usable and secure solution for
shared secret agreement in Wi-Fi Direct.
III. OBSERVATIONS ON THE PROBLEM STATE
Considering the state of problem pertaining to implemen-
tation of usable and secure D2D file exchange, we further
interpret the lessons learned from Android application analysis
to seek answers to the research questions mentioned in Section
I. When the systems are implemented in reality, a clear trade-
off between security and usability comes in to play as attempts
are made to fit the end user expectations. It becomes clear
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Fig. 6. Needful modifications with KTT
that the economics, hidden in high user base, is the key factor
governing the UI and UX priorities.
The study on product implementations show the initial
authentication and secret establishment is not inherent part of
the Wi-Fi Direct protocol. It is solely decided by the developers
who try to re-invent the software flow various ways. Hence
critical questions like:
I1: How to generate and share PINs?
I2: How to confirm authentication?
needs attentions and checked for workarounds. Another basic
assumption is that if PINs are shared with trusted mechanisms,
the communication channel will be secure through WPS provi-
sioning. An important factor which causes the user to appreci-
ate for the easiest way of association with another peer, for file
sharing, is the ground that D2D connections commonly happen
”on-the-fly” by portable devices. The application designers
in this case are challenged in finding a dedicated source of
randomness (entropy) for mutual authentication. Thus, it is
not easy to perform secure shared secret key agreement, i.e.
approach to generate and transmit passphrase without asking
the user to type them in.
 Addressing RQ1 and RQ2: The analysis of popular
D2D file sharing applications on Android, in Section II-C, re-
veals that in a race for growing the user base a number of trade-
offs are introduced in favour of seamless peer association but at
the cost of security. Notably, mirroring the similar functionality
from vendor to vendor often results in exact replication of
user interface to facilitate the user habits. We demonstrate that
with the identical patterns of user flow being reconstructed,
the similar bugs are also propagated to new implementations
by independent vendors. In addition, any radical change in
user interface can create competitive disadvantage and thus is
generally avoided by vendors. This motivates to work towards
a methodology to face usability considerations at the early
stages of the communication protocol design.
IV. CONSIDERATION OF USER EXPERIENCE
In this section we motivate the need for a joint notion of
usability and security. Further, we discuss how an unified map-
ping of experience and interaction among systems and users
can be helpful for Wi-Fi Direct based application designers.
 Addressing RQ3: In order to address RQ3, we break
the design of an end-to-end mobile application in to 3-phases
connected with feedback loops, Fig.(6). The investigation iden-
tifies two weak feedback links: a) feedback from the developers
and b) feedback from UX experts to protocol designers. UX
experts, as in the current state, review applications and prod-
ucts using different surveys and User Journey Maps (UJM),
[21], but only after deployments of software and user-interfaces
(UI). The feedback to UI and application development team are
well understood and taken care of in successive iterations of
an application. But there exists little or no provision to convey
issues to the protocol development team; due to different
terminologies or parameters and weak communication channel.
Similarly, ‘Best practice’ is often followed while designing se-
curity paradigms where human capabilities and psychological
relations are not taken in loop which subsequently leads to
security being perceived as burdensome and onerous, users
are asked to perform tasks beyond their capabilities, [22]
and [8]. The paper rather proposes to empower security and
protocol designers with an abstract understanding of takeaways
by research communities, including finding from psychology,
human-computer interaction, and design science.
We argue that Knowledge Transformation and Transfer
(KTT) would be a better strategy for usable security. As shown
in Fig. (6), security protocol design can be thought of as
two blocks: a) fundamental mathematics and b) protocol and
interactions. While designing steps of protocol and interac-
tion points, experts can gain from collaborative attempts of
researchers from heterogeneous domains including security,
psychology, human-computer-interaction and design science
and accommodate pre-defined suggestions. The system thus
developed will have inherent usability and would require less
time as well.
Typically, a usability study is performed after the comple-
tion of the core protocol design and when at least the UI mock-
up is produced. As discussed in section III and represented
in Fig. 6, the knowledge from previous studies and diverse
domains needs to be transferred and contextualized to protocol
design space in order to avoid workarounds by developers and
UI/UX designers. We aim to do so through extension of UJM
for interactive unification of protocol and user spaces. This can
form base for security architects to quantify the usability right
from the start of protocol design. The traditional tools, such
as System Usability Scale (SUS), [23] normally do not take
into account steps of the actual protocol development chain
and can only be adopted after the core logic and UI prototype
are designed.
A. Unification of System and User Space
We note that UJM is a standard method for experience
mapping of users and is popular in design science community,
[24]. But the inferences are very limited and done at the
product view. In practice, it can be cumbersome to test the
multi-user system with a set of interfaces right at the be-
ginning of protocol conceptualization. For the communication
protocol design, UJM is not fully suitable. In addition to
these limitations, currently there is no closed-loop-feedback
based representation methodology which allows security and
usability to intersect for a joint evaluation. Such as in the
case of D2D file sharing, security researchers do not have
well-defined metrics to quantify the future usability of the
protocol and estimate the user interactions. UX engineers, in
their turn, have no tool to affect the protocol space and are
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(a) Lookup table, Tin(Uin)
Fig. 7. An example of lookup table for Android applications
bound to develop the user flow under compatibility constraints
and limited knowledge provided on the core protocol.
In practice, a typical security system, product or service can
be considered in two conceptual spaces: a) protocol space and
b) user space. We modified UJM in attempt to bring these two
spaces under one tool, establishing a joint notion of security
and usability quantification. We encourage protocol designers
to consider the metrics as mentioned below:
1) Define expected user steps at each block.
2) Note down the points where user inputs or interac-
tions, Uin, are expected in any form, categorize user
interaction and assign a corresponding value, αi, from
the lookup table, Tin(Uin), Fig (7(a)).
3) Estimate the time taken, ti+1 − ti, at every step of
the system or protocol.
4) Calculate the usability as reciprocal of user engage-
ment, 1∑N
i=1 αi(ti+1−ti)
.
This approach expects the determination of blocks, user in-
teractions and time in computations in a way to benefit the
usability. Based on our study from the feedback across 43
participating users, we provide a lookup table, Fig.(7(a)) which
provides an example of interaction weights for typical actions
that they encountered in Android applications. As shown in
the lookup table, Fig.(7(a)), the weights are assigned to each
possible degree of interaction, αi. The clicks and taps, being
the easiest of tasks, are also lowest on interaction scores. The
action which require recalling from memory set additional
cognitive effort for users, hence accounts to score of 0.8.
Waiting for the UI to respond relates to the time. The longer
the time is spent for the system to respond or for the process
to complete, the larger is the resulting multiplicative value αi.
The described approach can be further extended to unify
the consideration of security principles and design science in a
way that it can be used as a tool while designing protocols and
ascertain that usability does not fall below a threshold when
the product is released. We believe that a similar approach can
facilitate the comparison of multiple drafts of the proposed
protocol and tracking the resulting user flow.
V. RELATED WORK AND DISCUSSION
The high user base of the applications reviewed in this
paper results in an increased impact of vulnerabilities which
appear in the ongoing releases. These issues could be faced in
advance by adopting highly usable methods of authentication
and pairing, given that they can be adopted without any
modifications to commercial devices. Multiple research have
tried to address the key issues related to I1 and I2 and have
encountered challenges in ensuring adoption in Commercial
off-the-shelf (COTS) devices and integration with Wi-Fi direct.
[25] suggests that Wi-Fi Direct is less favourable than
Hotspot for application development in terms of usability,
security and performance. [26] does an vulnerability disclo-
sures of printers and smart TVs from HP and Samsung and
highlights issues with WPS Provisioning. [27] highlights that
Group Owner (GO) devices in Wi-Fi Direct can be subjected
to the EvilDirect attack where an adversary can emulate as GO
and compromise the the wireless link between the clients and
the legitimate GO.
Previous methods of secret pairing like [28], [29], [30]
and [31], for spontaneously communicating devices, would not
work for non-contact devices as they require physical contact
for secret establishment. [32] requires touch interaction which
is not always a general case during D2D exchanges. [33]
requires ad-hoc setup and multiple antenna. [34] uses gesture
tagged codes but are limited by very low entropy and still has
dependencies on human cognition.
[35], [36] and [37] give details of security paradigms in
D2D communication network which encompasses both in-
band and out-band D2D pairing methods and cellular network
facilitated exchanges under the framework of 3GPP LTE.
A large portion of the works require AdHoc modes and
support from network. Thus, [18] identifies multiple attacks
in Wi-Fi Direct-based D2D communications and introduces a
short authentication-string-based key agreement protocol. To
effectively face the usability and security challenges, a system
is expected to have a minimal expectation for the user input.
For the file transfer in mobile environment, it is crucial to
support the seamless establishment of a communication link
for devices which have never been paired previously. As shown
in this work, limitation of these properties in the system design
reflects in the introduction of side channel credential transmis-
sion and weak design patterns by application developers.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper provides a joint security and usability study of
the top six most downloaded D2D file sharing applications
on Android and identifies the common factors behind the
vulnerabilities and insecure design decisions. We endorse an
open problem of usable security design which lies behind the
identified vulnerabilities and propose a concept of an extended
User Journey Map (UJM) as a step towards better notion for
application and protocol design. The further development of
joint consideration of impact factors could reduce the space
for appearance of identical vulnerabilities in applications and
their underlying systems at the early design stage.
Finally, with our analysis on the practical domain, we hope
to motivate more future work in the usability direction of
secure protocol design.
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Improper username sanitization in ReceiverFragmentPeer.java in the Google Files
(com.google.android.apps.nbu.files) through 1.0.220185905 allows the remote attacker to
tamper with the Receiver‘s connection confirmation
Reported to Google
(Patched 08.02.2019)
The TCP communication turns into clear-text in the Google Files
(com.google.android.apps.nbu.files) through 1.0.220185905 for Android if either the
Sender or the Receiver uses Android 7.1.2, allowing an in-network attacker to sniff and tamper
with Device-to-Device communication
Reported to Google (Ac-
cepted)
A Path traversal vulnerability in static/storage/* in the Xender (cn.xender) before 4.8.0.Prime
allows attackers to remotely retrieve arbitrary files from the device filesystem. The vulnerability
persists in the latest Xender 4.8.0.Prime.
CVE ID requested
Disclosed through Google
Play Security Reward
Program (Completed
20.12.2019)
A Path traversal vulnerability in waiter/downloadSharedFile in the Xender (cn.xender) before
4.2.2.Prime allows attackers to remotely retrieve arbitrary files from the device filesystem. The
vulnerability persists in the latest Xender 4.8.0.Prime.
CVE-2018-19313
Disclosed through Google
Play Security Reward
Program (Completed
10.09.2019)
A reflected Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the Web sharing functionality in the
SuperBeam (com.majedev.superbeam) application through 4.1.3 for Android allows remote
attackers to inject arbitrary JavaScript code via crafted URL to be executed on the client
CVE-2018-19314
A Denial-of-Service (DoS) vulnerability in the SuperBeam (com.majedev.superbeam) applica-
tion through 4.1.3 for Android allows attackers to drain the memory available to the application,
resulting in a remote crash by scheduling a high number of invalid download requests
CVE-2018-19315
In the Superbeam (com.majedev.superbeam) application through 4.1.3 for Android, the
filenames of sent files are not sanitized and are rendered raw in the file list when received
through the built-in web server endpoint on port 8080. The XSS, stored in the filename, is
executed on the Receiver side.
CVE-2018-19316
An insecure Wi-Fi access-point configuration in file-sharing functionality in the SHAREit
(com.lenovo.anyshare.gps) application through 4.5.84 on Android 7.1, 7.1.1 and 7.1.2 allows
the attackers to sniff and tamper with Device-to-Device communication
CVE-2018-19427
An insecure Wi-Fi access-point configuration in the Send File functionality in the Xender
(cn.xender) application through 4.2.2.Prime on Android 7.1, 7.1.1 and 7.1.2 allows attackers
to sniff and tamper with Device-to-Device communication
CVE-2018-19425
An insecure Wi-Fi access-point configuration in the Receive File functionality in Zapya
(com.dewmobile.kuaiya.play) application through 5.7 (US) on Android 7.1, 7.1.1 and 7.1.2
allows attackers to sniff and tamper with Device-to-Device communication
CVE-2018-19426
An application package traversal vulnerability in the ”Install SHAREit” widget served by a
built-in web server in the SHAREit (com.lenovo.anyshare.gps) application through 4.5.84 for
Android allows attackers to remotely enumerate installed application packages on the device and
download them from device filesystem via apps/*.apk/?channel=webshare on TCP port 2999.
The vulnerability persists in the latest SHAREit 5.0.88 ww.
CVE-2018-19428
Disclosed through Google
Play Security Reward
Program (Completed
11.09.2019)
An insecure limitation of a Sender‘s wireless network passphrase length, enforced by the
Receiver user interface in the Xender (cn.xender) application through 4.2.2.Prime on Android
facilitates remote attackers in password enumeration in order to associate with the device access
point, sniff and tamper with device-to-device communication
CVE-2018-19429
Cleartext file transmission via HTTP on port 6789 in WebShare mode in the Xender (cn.xender)
application through 4.2.2.Prime for Android allows an in-network attacker to sniff and tamper
with Device-to-Device communication
CVE-2018-19430
Cleartext file transmission via HTTP on port 2999 in WebShare mode in the SHAREit
(com.lenovo.anyshare.gps) application through 4.5.84 for Android allows an in-network
attacker to sniff and tamper with Device-to-Device communication
CVE-2018-19431
Anonymous FTP user, enabled by default in ”Connect to computer” functionality in the
Xiaomi MiDrop (com.xiaomi.midrop) application through 1.22.4 for Android allows an
unauthenticated attacker to remotely download the entire storage of the Android device
CVE-2018-19846
Unencrypted file transmission through FTP on port 2121 of the Android device in ”Connect
to computer” functionality in the Xiaomi MiDrop (com.xiaomi.midrop) application through
1.22.4 for Android allows the in-network attacker to sniff and tamper with files, transferred to
and from the Android device
CVE-2018-19847
TABLE III: List of vulnerabilities, discovered during our analysis
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